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Globalizing the Rule of Law: Some Thoughts at
and on the Periphery
MAXWELL 0. CHIBUNDU"

INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the unparalleled economic and political success of the
West, rendered in stark relief by the fall of the Berlin wall a decade ago, a
triad of concepts has been deployed both to explain the West's ascendancy,
and as a prescription for the laggards of the emerging (or "transitional") and
underdeveloped countries ofthe former communist and Third World societies.
"Democracy," the "free market," and the "rule of law" are advanced as a
trinity that underpin liberal capitalism,' and without which developing and
transitional societies will continue to languish in the shadows of misery.
These claims are then presented within what is surely the Zeitgeist of the
decade--"globalization." We live, it is frequently asserted, in a "global
village." By implication and frequent prescription, the "international
community" is (or must be) bound by uniform and universally shared rules,
practices, and institutions. Taken together, these four pillars of contemporary
"liberal" hegemonic ideology-democracy, free markets, rule of law, and
globalization-smilingly explain with equanimity and logic why it is in the
interest of the rest of the world to be like North America and Western Europe.
Tempting as it is either to accept or reject these claims as platitudes, or to
insist on their validation through rigorous empirical data, a third possibility is
to recognize that, like most social institutions (and the ideas that underpin
them), the truth (or poverty) of the claims (and therefore their ultimate utility,
if any), lie less in subjecting them to such classic rational proofs, and more in
* Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. I would like to thank Alfred C. Aman, Jr.,
David P. Fidler, and the Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington for giving me the opportunity to
reflect on the issues addressed in this piece. The views of my co-participants in the Symposium have
enriched my own, and for that I am grateful. My colleague, David Bogen, gave me very helpful criticisms
for which I am grateful. Finally, I acknowledge with appreciation the research assistance of Mr. Daniel C.
Gardner, University of Maryland Law School class of 2001.
I. See, e.g., President of the United States William Jefferson Clinton, Address to the 48th Session
of the United Nations General Assembly, U.S. News Wire, Sept. 27, 1993. available in LEXIS, News
Library, Wires File.
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the reasoned unearthing of the complex web of interconnected (and sometimes
contradictory) ideas at work in these simple but popular phrases. Seeking to
go beyond sloganeering-whether of the simple-minded or of the sophist-I
explore through this Article the murky relationship between norms and
descriptions. I take the idea of the rule of law as a value that (at least in the
abstract) commands approbation. Globalization, however, is generally used
descriptively but with the clear implication that since no force can change it,
all had better get on board. And so, most readers of this Article, as would
most others in the West, will have few qualms in prescribing the globalization
of the rule of law. But what are the implications of such a prescription? How
often do we take a stance outside of our self-created universe to consider the
ramifications of our prescriptions? Above all, what are the connections
between rules, practices, and institutions, and can these connections be created
or maintained within a universalist frame of reference?
For the purpose of this Article, I have chosen three themes whose
promotion command general assent within the communities that the readers
likely inhabit: globalization, privatization, and the rule of law. In examining
these three themes from the perspectives of their enthusiastic proponents in
the West and their more skeptical detractors in the disadvantaged areas of the
world, I seek to illuminate the extent to which the liberalism at the core of
contemporary globalism remains enmeshed in the prism of privilege, even as
it asserts the primacy of pluralism and preaches intolerance of local dictators
and autocrats.
The Article proceeds in the following stages. Part I presents some views
of "globalization." Part II outlines some features of the concept of the "rule
of law." Part III relates the rule of law to "privatization" as a factor of
globalization. Part IV explores the connection between a globalized rule of
law and international legality.
I. GLOBALIZATION

Much has been written about globalization, and adding to that confused
and confusing literature should be a last resort. Yet, if any sense is to be made
of the vast literature that this highly ambiguous term is generating, the reader
deserves some kind of reference point from the vantage of the writer. Within
that framework, it is essential to distinguish the rhetoric of globalization from
its reality, and that reality from utopian objectives.
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There is no doubting that we live in a world whose ideology and physical
endowment are significantly different from those that were prevalent even
twenty-years ago. The transmission and receipt of information across space
and time is markedly faster. The now ubiquitous networks of computers,
satellites, and telephones, and the audiovisual linkages that they make
possible, have clearly enabled increased flows of goods, capital, persons, and
information across traditional geographic and political boundaries2 at rates
that make the regulation of such flows less subject to ponderous bureaucratic
preferences. The hegemony of many nation-States over activities within their
borders, and perhaps over many of their citizens, is a good deal less secure.
The market is a more preferred institution for organizing and regulating
economic transactions, and the sphere within which such transactions are
thought to be appropriate has expanded immeasurably. 3 Whether these
changes imply a less heterogeneous world is more open to debate, for the
quantity of interactions does not necessarily speak to the quality of the
exchanges that they engender,4 and to the extent globalization is about the
transcendency of linkages, the quality of the ensuing exchanges is surely as
important as their quantity and velocity.'
Conceding the potential that technological change has for both the
temporal and spatial bridging of transnational socioeconomic practices, it
remains nonetheless possible to identify four conceptions of globalization with
special resonance for the rule of law, which are discussed below. While all
four share the recognition of globalization as having the potential to free
individual activity from conventional sources of authority-notably the
State-they differ markedly both in the extent to which they view such freedom
2. Debate exists about the extent to which current flows of goods and capital are markedly different
from those of earlier periods such as the turn of the twentieth century. See, e.g., David Goldblatt & David
Held, Economic Globalization and the Nation-State: Shifting the Balance Power, in 22 ALTERNATIVES:
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND HUMAN GOVERNANCE (Iss. 3, 1997). What seems above the fray is that
the instantaneous and broad integration of the transnational communications that are integral to the
movements of capital, goods, and persons is qualitatively different today than it was in the prior periods
of internationalization. That difference has significance for the cultural content of globalization which is
essentially at the core of the concept of the rule of law, and of this Article.
3. For a succinct and well-articulated review of the virtues and limits of globalization, see Paul B.
Stephan, Book Review, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 246 (1997) (reviewing DANI RODRICK, HAS
GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? (1998)).
4. See, e.g., Kevin R. Cox, Introduction: GlobalizationandIts Politics in Question, in SPACES OF
GLOBALIZATION: REASSERTING THE POWER OFTHE LOCAL 1,3 (Kevin R. Cox ed., 1997); PAUL Q. HIRST,
GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION: THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF GOVERNANCE

(Paul Hirst & Grahame Thompson eds., 1996).
5. Compare Ray Kiely, Introduction: Globalisation, (Post-)Modernity and the Third World, in
GLOBALIZATION AND THE THIRD WORLD 1,4-5 (Ray Kiely & Phil Marfleet eds., 1998).
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as already having taken place, and the normality of unshackled individualism.
Three of these four conceptions of globalization emphasize the importance of
globalization as a dynamic process, 6 while a different, yet somewhat
overlaping, group of three hails it for its focus on liberating the individual
from forced institutional choices.
Two views of globalization tout its primary virtue as liberating the
individual from the tyranny of authority: that of the State, and that of the
multinational corporation. Under the former view, the technology of
instantaneous communication renders archaic the geography of place by
permitting one and all to be participants in the life of all and allowing each
individual the freedom to express his or her own uniqueness. Life is lived in
the present, not in the past, and to see is to be. Globalization clips the
authority of traditional institutions-including, and perhaps especially, the
State-by making it possible for insiders to communicate in real-time with
outsiders, and for outsiders to bring pressure to bear on local politicians
(including other gatekeepers of tradition such as religious leaders and party
officials). The insider also obtains a vista into the outside world and is
thereby able to recognize repressive rules, customs, and habits. Not
surprisingly, proponents of "international human rights" and of "democracy,"
who hold these conceptions of global ization, invoke it as an ally in the project
of universalizing the ground rules for acceptable politics and statecraft.
A related but distinguishable invocation of globalization focuses on its
potential to upend those economic relationships between the individual and
the enterprise that have been fostered by the industrial revolution. For some,
globalization is to be lauded because it permits each and every individual to
become an entrepreneur capable of independently discovering and exploiting
markets for goods and services without being tethered to conventional cultural
strictures. The individual can therefore challenge the "big corporation" by
giving or withdrawing her labor, consumption, or investment at will, with little
regard for the confines of space, culture, or politics.
For others, that the corporation can exploit the same liberating technology
to offer or withdraw employment, locate investments, exploit markets, or
evade national regulations, presents a distinctly different perspective on
globalization. In a world where temporal boundaries are rendered less and
less consequential, given consumption patterns in which demands for services
are less easily satiated than demands for goods and immobile industrial labor,
and where the mandatory command of State authority shares equal (if not
6. See Bruce Mazlish, A Tour of Globalization, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5 (1999).
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inferior) billing in popular legitimation with privately ordered rules, the
globalization of the power of the multinational corporation is a phenomenon
that should not be equated with the empowerment of the individual, civil
society, or "grass roots non-governmental organizations."
Finally, a common usage of "globalization" has served the same purpose
for the last fifth of the twentieth century that terms such as "modernity" and
"post-modernity," "internationalization,"
"interdependence,"
"industrialization," "developed," or even "civilized" have done for other
periods-that is, the crystallization of an otherwise vacuous abstraction of a
consequential norm of "progress." The term "globalization" ambiguously
evokes and beguilingly promotes the description and adoption of a loosely
framed set of Western institutions and practices as the standard means for
structuring and understanding relationships that cross geopolitical and cultural
boundaries. It serves both to disclaim any particularized functional meaning
and also to recommend, through the surface objectivity of triumph and
success, the universalization of core practices and institutions that might
otherwise be considered of parochial interest only. The globalization of such
entertainment as Hollywood films or television programs, like the
transnationalization of eating habits as manifested by Chinese, Mexican, and
fast food chains, are no more indicative of Western hegemony than Islamic
fundamentalism is of Arab hegemony. By extension, the ascendancy of
democratic rule, multicultural education, adjudication, privatization, and
floating currencies epitomize universal demands. The cultural phenomenon
of globalization is thus to be cut loose from its moorings in any particular
setting, reflecting rather the satisfaction of the demands and aspirations of a
global community.
To expound on the idea of the rule of law as an element of the
globalization creed thus provides one means of inspecting the differing
conceptions of globalization. In what follows, I exploit the concept both for
its consequentialist values and for the purpose of defining the boundaries of
its normative innocence. The concept of the rule of law is especially wellsuited for this undertaking for a variety of reasons: the idea-at least in its
unelucidated form-commands virtual universal approbation, it transcends the
moral and functional dichotomy, and as indicated earlier, it has become a
7. See generally Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule ofLav: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J.
561(1977) (reviewing DOUGLAS HAY ETAL., ALBION'S FATALTREE: CRIMEAND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTHCENTURY ENGLAND (1975); E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT
(1975)).
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prevalent and universalist justification for what might otherwise appear to be
self-interested prescriptions of policy. Most significantly, however, its
realization is dependent as much on internally embedded institutions and
practices as on explicitly articulated ideas and objectives.
II. THE RULE OF LAW
In thinking about social practices or institutions, especially those that have
attained (or fallen into) the domain of a cliche (where the idea of the rule of
law now dwells),' it is convenient and useful to begin by stating the intuition
commonly associated with the practice or institution. On its face, the phrase
suggests subjection to law, obedience to it, and guidance by it. As will
become evident from the ensuing discussion, this implies a positivistic
conception of law; that is, a notion of law as an artifice of human organization
that functions within particularized associations, and whose parameters,
however ambiguous in their generalities, are susceptible of being ascertained
in particular instances.9 The idea of the rule of law thus elicits an imagined
realm dominated by the evenhanded and principled use of social power. It is
deployed as an oppositional concept to arbitrary rule or rule by caprice. As
such, it is a statement of the "supremacy" of law over "personal rule" or
expedient politics.
Within this framework, two plausible (but extreme) conceptions of the
rule of law should be eliminated-expediently, as it were. The first conception
to be eliminated is the idea that the "rule of law" means the unyielding
enforcement of whatever is deemed or proclaimed to be "law" by whoever is
in power. The second is a set of immutable orders that must be undeviatingly
adhered to or enforced against all persons at all times and in all circumstances.
On the one hand, both of these approaches possess the capacity to yield
stability or order, a "virtue" with which law is frequently associated. On the
other hand, neither of these will endure or indeed be tolerated within any of
the social structures that characterize human organization. Intuition suggests
that the rule of law has as a primary purpose the compulsion of
accountability-it should be able to compel the lawgiver as well as the subjects.
However, a principle that fails to discriminate among persons and
8. Compare Richard H. Fallon Jr., "The Rule of Lamv" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,
97 COLUM. L. REV. I (1997) (arguing that invocations of the "Rule of Law" are often conclusory and
contradictory).
9. Compare Kent Greenawalt, Too Thin and Too Rich: Distinguishing Features ofLegal Positivism,
in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM I, 13-16 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
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circumstances will be ineffective. All our senses impose on us the need to
discriminate, and that can hardly be less true of the rule of law than it is of our
physical senses.
Within these polar ends, history and logic suggest three ways of viewing
the rule of law.'0 First, we may mean and insist on the existence of specific
rules or laws that further human welfare. Thus, only those societies that enact
and faithfully attempt to enforce certain kinds of laws may be said to be ruled
by law. Second, by the "rule of law," we may be referring to the
internalization ofthe values embedded in the procedural aspects of regularized
lawmaking and law enforcement. Finally, the phrase may describe the
aggregate benefits that derive from institutionalizing the mechanisms and
processes of lawmaking, interpreting the law, and law enforcement. Of
course, a society that embodies all three would be the consummate rule of law
society. But these attributes come in varied doses to different societies at
different times. Far from being mutually reinforcing, their histories suggest
they may diverge, forcing a society to act in preference to one or the other
conception of the rule of law. Thus, for utilitarian and epistemological
reasons, it is worthwhile to understand the environment for the dominance of
each view of the rule of law, and for their optimization.
A. The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules
All societies, it is fair to say, are governed by rules. Rules can be
classified along many dimensions, such as their nature, purpose or function,
source, and (most pertinent for the purposes of this Article), flexibility of
application. We are, of course, familiar with the distinction between legal
positivism and natural law. Indeed, but for our embrace of legal positivism,
it is fair to say that the liberal, administrative, bureaucratized welfare State
would otherwise be illegitimate. It is no coincidence that legal positivism
emerged contemporaneously with the welfare State-first in Continental
Europe, and then in the Anglo-American world.
A variant of the positivism-natural law debate is currently being played
out in the context of the rules versus standards debate. It is a debate that most
of us can luxuriate in, confident as we are that the outcome is unlikely to
challenge foundational aspects of our contemporary life. Yet, the rulesstandards dichotomy is one that is critical to the conception of the rule of law
10. I have developed these themes elsewhere. See Maxwell 0. Chibundu, LaIv in Development: On
Tapping, Gourding, and Serving Palm-Wine, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 167, 235-42 (1997).
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in the so-called emerging or transitional societies, and certainly in the
developing countries ofsub-Saharan Africa. There, the rules-standards debate
is far from being solely of academic interest..
The adoption, enactment, promulgation, and above all, codification of
statutes and decisional judicial rules are tendered not only as indicia of the
rule of law in developing societies, but more significantly as instrumentally
relevant to the modernization of their economic and political infrastructures.
In the economic area, for example, there are vigorous arguments for more or
less nondiscretionary official stipulations on such otherwise highly contested
subjects as title to property, means and levels of taxation, foreign investment,
privatization, and the regulation of securities markets and corporate
governance. The specificity of rules is posited as enhancing "transparency,"
while the vesting of discretion in bureaucratic or political entities is often
viewed as tantamount to encouraging corruption and the abuse of power.
Belief in the efficacy of specific rules as an instrument of economic
growth is not, however, a 1990s phenomenon. It dates back to the first wave
of the "law and development" movement which flourished in the immediate
aftermath of the decolonization process of the early 1960s. That movement
has been written about extensively, and its features will not be rehashed
here." It does share, with the contemporary globalization Zeitgeist, a belief
in the agency of specifically articulated rules to promote economic growth by
putting the foreign investor on notice, thereby shaping her expectations and
commitments. Of course, the march towards authoritarianism in much of the
developing world in the late 1960s and 1970s demonstrated four distinctive
shortcomings of the rule of law defined in terms of the specificity of rules.
First, in the hands of civilian governments, neither the specificity of rules
nor their codification proved to be effective deterrents to extra-legal conduct.
The difference between "law in the books" and "law in action" was a good
deal more profound in real life than most North American legal realists could
have imagined, even in the most hyperbole-laden of illustrations. Second, the
new military autocrats proved to be as capable (or in many instances even
more capable) of drafting highly specific substantive rules as the civilian
governments that they overthrew. In fact, in many instances, the "decree"
drafters were the same civil servants and bureaucrats who had spearheaded
codification. Third, there was little to correlate the specificity of laws (or for
that matter law in general) with the inflow of foreign investments or with
economic performance. Rather, governmental policies, both in developing
II. See generally id.
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and industrialized countries, which were generally expedient responses to
geopolitical considerations were better predictors of the giving of economic
incentives and, over the medium- to long-run, of economic performance.
Fourth, the content of many of the specific substantive rules was anything but
liberal. Thus, few laws could be more specific than those which nationalized
foreign interests, or which stipulated the method for calculating the value of
expropriated property.
Similarly, within the political arena, specificity in the articulation of
constitutional rights has long been a hallmark of post-colonial States. The
approach has tended to receive less endorsement from Western intellectuals
than specificity in the economic sphere. Yet, it is difficult to see why it makes
sense to insist on specificity in the promulgation of those rules that seek to
regulate economic behavior, but not those in the political arena. An attempted
conventional explanation borrows from Isaiah Berlin's frequently invoked
distinction between "negative" and "positive" freedom.' Political rules, as
conventional jurisprudence teaches, work best when framed as limits on State
power, rather than by imposing affirmative obligations on the State. Such
prohibitions should be general, not specific. .
The rules-standards dichotomy points out a crucial feature of the "rule of
law" arguments to which I shall return. It is that the idea may have
significantly different meanings for the player from without, than it does for
the player from within. For the foreign investor, specificity of economic rules
is preferable to a lack thereof, even when those rules-are unlikely to be
enforced. Such specificity provides at least a totem that may be useful even
for those skilled in navigating the intricacies of operational law. For the
player from within, however, especially the underprivileged members of that
community, it may well be that it is the explicit statement of the affirmative
obligations of the State that are critical. Thus, for example, in the current
climate of privatization, the foreign investor likely prefers a legal regime that
articulates as specifically as possible the rules of the game. An employee in
an entity to be privatized, however, may prefer rather vague rules on
privatization, and would rather push for a provision within a constitution that
assures to all a right to full employment, however "pie in the sky" the idea
might seem to the outsider.

12. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts ofLiberty (1958), reprinted in ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON
LIBERTY (1969).
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B. The Rule of Law as Process
Liberalism, it is commonly noted, is characterized first and foremost by
its commitment to process, rather than to specific substantive rules, virtues,
or norms. 3 This is certainly the case with the liberal idea of the rule of law.
Process seeks to channel administrative fiat, to provide to all equal
opportunity and access to decisionmaking, to routinize the processing and
adjudication of claims, and to assure the integrity of the rule of law by
segregating judicial independence from ordinary politics. In regularizing
judicial decisionmaking, such process purports both to afford equal treatment
to those who invoke the applicable law, and to render law administrators
accountable to society without making them subject to its transient whims.
It turns out, however, that law as process is not quite as transparently
objective as one might wish. Essentially, the core problem stems from the
familiar chestnut that it may bejust as evil to treat differently situated persons
alike as it is to treat like persons differently. Similarly, a procedure that works
in one circumstance may be entirely unsuitable for another, and given the
abstract quality of processes, it may be less susceptible to conditioned
negotiation than substantive rules. This is particularly likely to be the case in
a political environment where plural politics is characterized less by shifting
coalitions of functional interest groups than by long-enduring cleavages that
track primordial attachments.
The failure of process as a check on governmental power in the newly
independent States of Africa was often cited as an indicator of the failure of
the rule of law in those societies and an explanation for their continuing
economic underperformance. 14 In the 1990s, it is quite commonplace to
prescribe process as an ingredient of liberal constitutionalism and as essential
to attracting foreign investment. Yet, consider the implications of this view
of the rule of law from two distinct perspectives: those of the foreign investor
and those of the locals.
From the former's perspective, process is a standardized structure for
obtaining decisions and for resolving disputes, the cabining of administrative
and political discretion, and nondiscriminatory treatment vis-a-vis the natives.
In short, some degree of certainty, predictability, and (as the foreigner would
13. See generally LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984).
14. See generally David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WiS. L. REV. 1062
(1975).

1999]

GLOBALIZING THE RULE OF LAW

contend) "fairness" are required within even a flexible regime of substantive
rules. In this framework, society need not bind itself to specific rules so long
as it makes clear and adheres to established processes for deciding and
implementing the rules. Unspoken, of course, is the reality that functioning
within a process-based legal regime requires expertise of a highly technical
character. For example, one is not only familiar with the specific rules in
question, but is also aware of whose mores dictate the capacity to manipulate
those rules by playing the process game. Obtaining such expertise can be
expensive. That is probably the point of critical relevance to the locals; yet,
there are other salient points.
The relevant process for rule of law purposes, of course, does not refer to
the traditional practices or conventions of the developing society. Indeed,
most post-colonial countries could not (and for all practical purposes cannot
now) meaningfully appeal to traditional practices because they possessed no
single coherent set of practices that transcended the multinational,
multilingual, multireligious, and/or multiethnic communities that colonial
powers bludgeoned into European-style nation-States at the eve of
decolonization. The new States arguably could have sought to fashion
administrative rules from the composite of their several indigenous
conventions. But it is no less likely that the cost of arriving at the necessary
compromises would have been just as high, and with no greater certainty of
success than the alternative that most of them took: succeeding to the
inherited practices left by the departing colonizers. Nonetheless, the adoption
by these countries of procedural rules, which were developed for the
governments and courts of the colonizing countries, required the postcolonized countries to invest heavily in creating a new cadre of experts who
learned the law without necessarily being imbued by it.
That Western legal procedures and practices proved, for the most part, to
be no more than alien rituals indifferently practiced by the legal technocrats
of the developing countries and easily cast off as inconvenient when
challenged by political developments was a familiar criticism of the law and
development movement. Yet, that should hardly have come as a surprise. The
cost and complexities of formal process generated informal routines of
problem-solving while lacking institutional support. These informal routines
were impotent to replace the formal procedures.
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C. Institutions as the Rule of Law
"Wishing" may not "make it so," but in our mass media-driven society,
"naming it" seemingly does make it so. Often in the popular imagination (and
that may be all that counts in the contemporary environment), a society is
"democratic" apparently because we say it is, 15 and once pronounced
democratic, it is automatically a "rule of law" society. Similarly, a "free
market" environment exists when and if opinion-shapers so assert, and having
thus concluded, it follows that the society is or is not governed by the rule of
law. Current standard rhetoric thus presents a tautology: to declare a society
"democratic," "market oriented," or "rule of law based" is a statement that if
a society posseses one virtue, it also must possess the others. Current usage
of these terms seem incapable of acknowledging a descriptive phenomenon
without according (or denying) full-fledged legitimation to the society in
question.
But what makes these three otherwise distinguishable concepts cohere?
Increasingly, the response of social scientists who accept the rhetoric is to find
coherence in the study of "institutions." Lawyers, faithful to the pragmatism
of the profession, have embraced the "new institutionalism" by defining the
rule of law less with regard to substance and procedure and more with the
capacities and functioning of the implementing institutions. 6
Such
institutionalism operates at three levels. First is the articulation of the
distinctive role of the judiciary as a separate and independent branch of
government, but with the authority-indeed responsibility-to check the
exercise of power by the other branches. Second, essential to judicial
independence is the qualification and competence of the individuals who run
the judiciary (including judges, lawyers, and administrators, among others).
Third, the effective functioning of the judiciary depends as much on the
availability of necessary tools (mortar, paper, and computers) as on the spirit
and competence of personnel.
Policymakers in the West-especially those responsible for development
assistance both within individual governments and in the multilateral financial
15. The tendency to equate democracy with our conception of the good society is not limited to the
popular media. Academic commentators seemingly use the term loosely and interchangeably with terms
like "just society," "republican form of government," and "liberal/constitutional/human rights-based
governance." Its basis in "majority rule" appears to be simply a necessary but hardly a sufficient condition.
Cf.Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. I, 13-20 (1995).
16. Notably, the focus is on judicial rather than legislative, executive, or administrative institutions,
perhaps because the functioning of the latter are typically associated with the "democratic" norm.
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institutions-have thus in recent years focused on elaborating the institutional
elements of the rule of law. Preaching U.S.-style "separation of powers"
doctrine, aid to and reform of the judiciary of transitional and emerging
countries sometimes have been conditioned on the "independence" of the
judiciary, a phrase often equated, however erroneously, with the availability
ofjudicial review. Further, it has become quite customary for foundations and
aid donors in the West to direct attention to the qualification and competence
of officials and personnel (as well as the equipment at their disposal)
connected with lawmaking and enforcement in these transitional
societies-from the military to the civil service and from legislators to judges.
There is the recognition that the rule of law may depend as much on the
practical availability of tools as it does on the intentions and philosophies of
law.
Yet, there is scant evidence that institutionalism will successfully bring
the rule of law to those societies where the formulation of substantive rules
and proceduralism have failed. After the initial embrace of institutionalism
by these societies (hardly a surprise since there were invariably substantial
pools of funds at stake), scholars and jurists in these societies are increasingly
questioning whether institutionalism constitutes any less of an imperial
undertaking than the transplantation of substantive rules and processes.
And yet, the rule of law does matter-even when viewed independently of
the market or of plural democracy. Despite the difficulty of generating
consensus on substantive rules, and while substantive rules are-capable of
being manipulated, a society that gives heed to substantive rules is more likely
to be effectively run than one that does not. Similarly, notwithstanding the
economic costs involved in creating procedural edifices, the existence of
procedural rules that are followed go a long way toward legitimizing the
outcomes generated from their use. And of course, institutionalized
practices
often tend to command reflexive acceptance, thereby dispensing with the costs
of constant challenges and attendant uncertainties. These benefits can be
realized whether the rule of law emerges from the interplay of market forces
and pluralism, or.from enlightened despotism. What can be said for the
former is that they may be more likely to generate a rule of law regime than
the latter. In what follows, I explore the relevance of the concept of the rule
of law to privatization in orderto illustrate its strengths and weaknesses within
the contemporary setting of globalization.
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III. PRIVATIZATION AND THE RULE OF LAW

The proselytizing of privatization as a universal good is rivaled only by
the touting of globalization, democracy, and the rule of law as universal
goods. While privatization, like globalization, was clearly on the rise in the
1980s, it has come to the fore in the last decade. As with "democracy" and the
"rule of law," its universalization is primarily a function of the collapse of the
Cold War international order. And while the adoption of privatization policies
have no doubt been coerced in some cases by such expediencies as pending
national bankruptcies, it is equally clear that many of its proponents, whether
in the West, the East, or the South, argue for it on profound philosophical and
functional grounds. Privatization, as a rule of law proposition, thus requires
understanding its current acceptance, not only as a functional economic
instrument, but equally as a political statement reflecting both the geopolitical
and temporal dynamics of globalization discussed in the previous section.
As an initial matter, while exorbitant claims are sometimes made for
linking the rule of law to privatization, the cause and effect relationship
between them is more sensibly viewed as operating at the margins.
Privatization, like nationalization before it, is a macroeconomic policy whose
parameters and contours are determined by political considerations. For the
implementing government, the primary determinants of the decision to
privatize include the following: ideology, capital and employment needs,
sustainability of fiscal and monetary policies, and pressures from external
financial institutions and foreign governments. For the investor, the economic
terms of the transaction are primary. The weight and values assigned these
considerations, of course, may be influenced by the rule of law criterion.
Thus, since one of the motivations for privatization frequently is to elicit
financial inflows from foreign investors, a privatizing government is likely to
adopt those measures that foreign owners of capital would consider as
consistent with the rule of law. Similarly, an investor's calculation of the
potential returns on an investment made in a privatized entity will likely
reflect a rule of law premium or discount. For the privatizing government, the
consequences of the perceptions held by the investor and the international
financial institutions are real, but they alone do not determine privatization
policies.
The animating philosophy of privatization is a distrust of governments as
stewards and managers of economic assets. In many cases, this distrust is
grounded on the inefficiencies of political bureaucracies that attempt to
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maximize profit-surely an oxymoron. In the immediate post-World War II
period, these inefficiencies were tolerated as necessary costs of the
experiments in post-war reconstruction and the creation ofjust and equitable
welfare societies (e.g., Western Europe), economic development (e.g., Latin
America), or as integral to political independence and nation-building (e.g.,
Africa and South Asia). The results were "mixed economies" in which the
State, for a variety of reasons, acquired outright ownership in certain
industries, while heavily regulating others. Thus, the so-called "natural
monopolies" (typically in such infrastructure-related industries as
transportation and such public utilities as energy and telecommunications),
extractive industries (e.g., mining and forest products), infant industries
(notably beer brewing and textiles in Africa and South Asia), and "national
security enterprises" (including broadcasting, banking, aircraft, and uranium
processing) were acquired by governments to save employment in failing
industries, for national security purposes, to protect the "national patrimony"
Rarely were
from foreign ownership, or as sources of patronage.
microeconomic considerations relevant factors in these cases, and
macroeconomic concerns were relevant only in the broadest sense.
From a rule of law perspective, whether in the advanced industrial States
of the West, the authoritarian military regimes of Latin America, or the
embryonic post-colonial States of Africa, the move to State control was
accomplished well within the bounds of recognized rule of law principles.
The point is best illustrated by reflecting on those cases that most seem to
challenge it, namely, the nationalization projects' of many developing
countries in the extractive industries (notably crude oil and copper) in the
1960s and 1970s. 8 While the economic rationale and political wisdom of
these projects may be questioned, there is no arguing the legalisms of their
implementation.
Typical nationalization was the product of extended bargaining between
the national government and the foreign concession holder. In such
maneuvering, each side framed economic and political power (or their relative
lack thereof) in terms of legal rights. For national governments, mineral
resources represented the "commanding heights of the economy," and
ownership in and control of these resources were necessary incidents of
17. By "nationalization," here, I mean State-ownership and control rather than "indiginization" or the
shifting of ownership and control to nationals. Both forms of "nationalization" can and were sometimes
effectuated through "expropriation."
18. See generally PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE (Kamal Hossain & Subrata Roy Chowdhury eds., 1984).
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"national sovereignty."' 9 For foreign (usually multinational) companies,
economic interests were secured by preexisting arrangements, notably
previous contracts. Hence, the legal question was framed in terms of the
scope of the legal doctrines of "pacta sunt servanda" and "rebus sic
stantibus." What is important here is not which doctrine trumped (neither
did), but the realization that the inevitable reallocation of some (but equally
inevitably not all) preexisting rights and powers should be mediated by resort
to established legal doctrines. That there was (and in fact still remains) lack
of clarity as to the prevailing doctrine in a given circumstance, and that the
parties were not equally happy with the outcomes, does not detract from the
rule-bound character of the bargaining processes. The rule of law does not
depend for its legitimacy on the automatic application of clearly specified
doctrines, or on the existence of equal and like bargaining powers among the
parties.
Nor was the effort to adhere to the rule of law limited to those aspects of
the nationalization process that involved foreign interactions. Of particular
relevance to the emergence of the rule of law concept in current discussions
on foreign investments is that the host countries implemented their
nationalization programs through the statutory creation of legally autonomous
or semiautonomous parastatals. In theory, if not in practice, the legal regime
provided criteria-based independence and accountability for these institutions.
Indeed, much of the legal structures were borrowed from Western Europe. In
the context of Nigeria, for example, the new parastatals created to deal with
the nationalized crude oil sector were patterned after the various produce
marketing-boards bequeathed to the Nigerian polity by the post-World War II
colonial administration.
The point then is that the collapse of the State interventionist model
evident in the privatization movement cannot be attributed simply to the legal
roots (or more accurately, the supposed lack thereof). The existence of formal
institutions may be necessary to the idea of the rule of law in the foreign
investment sphere, but they are hardly sufficient. It is against this backdrop
that I explore the concept of the rule of law in the current privatization
environment.

19. See, e.g., Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res.
3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., 2229th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 7,U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201 (1974),
reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974); Charter ofEconomic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 328 1,U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., 2315th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 48, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (1975), reprinted in 14
I.L.M. 251 (1975).
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That the ouster of State ownership and control (i.e., privatization) must be
subject to the rule of law would seem to be an axiomatic proposition. The sort
of "transparent" accountability fostered by the rule of law seems particularly
apposite where public property is being disposed of in an environment
characterized as much by qualitative ideological commitment as by
quantifiable yardsticks. Privatization schemes should thus be subjected to rule
of law evaluation for the following reasons: first, as a means of compelling
public officials to think through and enact laws or edicts that favor the public
interest over private ones; second, that in the implementation of the laws,
bureaucrats do not misappropriate public property either to benefit
themselves, relatives, friends, or others from whom they have received or
intend to receive favors; third, that national laws and policies are consistent
with international norms; and fourth, that decisionmakers focus as much on
the long-term consequences of their laws and policies as on exigent factors or
short-term returns. In short, the rule of law concept encourages and permits
the scrutiny of official action by outsiders through the prism of dispassionate
analysis. Whether such "objectivity" implies the universalization of
applicable criteria is at the heart of potential disagreements over the rule of
law. Differences over the application of the concept of the rule of law to
privatization (or indeed any other aspects of contemporary globalization) thus
are less about the potential utility of the concept as about its application in the
particular circumstance.
Consider the first two arguments above. In the privatization setting, the
rule of law fosters the articulation and implementation of laws and policies
that favor public interest. Empirical support for this position has been found
by contrasting the privatization process within societies acknowledged to be
governed by the rule of law-notably Western Europe-with those where the
rule of law (when grudgingly acknowledged to exist) is said to rest on less
secure grounds. The former situation is characterized by clear and specific
legislation that is transparently implemented. In the latter situation, legislation
is frequently of a general and highly discretionary (if not muddled) character,
that is effectively not subject to reasoned legal review. Such general and
discretionary legislation is antithetical to the idea of the rule of law because,
among other things, it shifts the focus of power, responsibility, and ultimately
accountability from legislators to bureaucrats. This is so because the
legislation: first, fails to give readily executable guidelines to bureaucrats;
second, denies potential investors meaningful legal rights in the form of the
precise scope of the rules of the game, as well as easily ascertainable and
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enforceable rules or standards; and third, limits the capacity of the public to
monitor or otherwise participate in the privatization process.
Whatever may be the correctness of these claims, what they demonstrate
is the close relationship between legislation and enforcement. All societies
decry poor legislating and loose enforcement. The ideal situation would be
to have clear legislation arrived at by consensus and enforced in a frictionless
manner. While this ideal may seem attainable from the vantage point of the
foreign investor, the political demands and institutional structures of the host
country render unattainable such a friction-free environment. However, this
ideal would not necessarily prove advantageous for democracy or pluralism
in such societies. Thus, putting aside these idealized situations, we are
confronted with interesting questions as to the nature, scope, and valuations
of the trade-offs inherent in the relationships between clear legislation and
discretionary implementation.
Clear and specific legislation requires at a minimum the conjunction of
three premises: national consensus on the privatization scheme; an effectively
administered legislature; and a proficient technocracy of bill drafters. The
concurrent existence of these three requirements may emerge over a period of
time, but in the short-term (the period within which most globalization issues
are discussed), their coincidence is not only highly unlikely, but efforts to
create them will generate countervailing societal pressures.
Because privatization necessarily involves the reallocation and
redistribution of hitherto public resources, it is likely to generate division in
a legislative body that genuinely represents the interests of a diverse
community. Inherent uncertainties about privatization, such as the value of
the assets to be privatized, the most efficacious manner of privatization, the
necessity (if any) for differential regulation, and the need for residual State
ownership or control demand vigorous debate and compromised resolutions.
The problem of valuation falls into two broad categories. First, it is
unclear what assets should be privatized. This issue is particularly acute in the
privatization of infrastructural interests in the so-called "natural monopolies,"
such as the production of electricity or the running of airports. Whether these
entities should be sold as a unit, transferring wholesale their monopolization
of essential facilities (e.g., traffic control and electricity distribution), or
whether they should be broken up into component parts (e.g., terminal and
landing facilities separated from traffic control, or power generation separated
from electrical distribution) pose as many political as economic questions, and
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the approach taken necessarily affects valuation.2" Second, since these assets
were acquired and operated by the government for a variety of reasons,
traditional economic yardsticks of valuation, such as return on assets or
replacement costs, may be inapposite. This is especially the case in formerly
socialist societies and some developing countries where the classical
conception of a market, as operating optimally in terms of arms-length
transactions among voluntary buyers and sellers, is at best fledgling.
Solutions developed in long-functioning market societies or mixed economies
such as those of Western Europe or Latin America may be of little relevance
in Eastern Europe or Africa.
Similarly, there is no uniformly appropriate method fortransferring public
assets to the private sector. Rather, each society must develop and implement
those means that take account of its history, politics, economic structures, and
future aspirations. Over the last decade, at least five distinguishable
approaches have been tried, each reflecting political compromises as much as
economic realities. For developed capitalist economies like the United
Kingdom, existing stock-market exchanges offer adequate fora for
privatization. Preexisting mechanisms for setting the price of initial offerings
can be resorted to, and once undertaken, the fully functioning secondary
market can be relied upon to apportion the risks and benefits of ownership.
But even in these societies, so strong is the political linkage to privatization
that the market mechanism alone has not been relied upon to distribute its
spoils. In seeking to privatize coal mines in the United Kingdom, for example,
politics-rather than economics-dictated parliamentary allotment of shares in
the mines to coalminers at non-market prices. Likewise, the retention of the
so-called "golden share," which has become a feature not only of British
privatization, but of privatizations in other developed market economies such
as France, Germany, and Italy,2 merely illustrates the axiom that the nature
and scope of privatizations frequently are determined as much by political as
by economic forces.
The political-economic divide is even more blurred in societies where the
allocational function of formal market exchanges is of more recent vintage.
Here, legislatures cannot simply rely on well-established customs and
practices, but must seek to give effect on a case-by-case basis to arrive
politically at distributions. This often results in general legislation wherein
20. See generally MARGARET THATCHER, THE DOWNING STREET YEARS 685-87 (1993).
21. See. e.g., Alexander Marquardt& Ellen H. Clark, French Privatizations andinternational Capital
Markets, 15 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & BUS. 408,417-18 (1994).
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the particular parameters have to be worked out in the administrative
environment. East European legislatures, thus, have experimented with a
variety of approaches ranging from the ostensibly "democratic" (but arguably
more appropriately termed "populist") schemes of distributing vouchers to the
general public, to the "corporatist" allocation of assets to managers, workers,
or other stakeholders within the enterprise.2 2 In some instances, as a means
of dealing with both the valuation and distribution problems, these societies
as well as many in Africa and Latin America have relied on "negotiated bids"
for, or auctions of, specific assets rather than on the sale of enterprises as
going concerns.23 Because these dispositions are likely to generate highly
particularized problems in individual transactions, it may be counterproductive to insist on narrowly drawn legislation as a prerequisite to
effectuating them. For both political and economic reasons, the legislative
mechanisms authorizing the transfer of assets from the public to the private
sector may span a broad gamut, without thereby impugning the integrity of the
process, or more particularly running afoul of the rule of law. In any event,
the pull-and-tug of deliberations over these choices, buffeted as they will be
by the special pleadings of particular interest groups, may be as essential to
the legitimization of the democratic credentials of enacting legislatures as is
the validation of their representativeness through the ballot-box. The result
of the deliberative process, if fairly pursued against the backdrop of relative
inexperience in the privatization process, is likely to be unclear and
ambiguous legislation. Indeed, appropriate legislation may leave it up to a
professional bureaucracy to create rules on an ad hoc basis in response to
experience and evolving concerns.
Yet, the resulting grant of bureaucratic discretion must be checked. There
is no disputing the power that bureaucrats exercise as a result of imprecise
legislating. Moreover, the technocratic competence of the bureaucrats who
find themselves thrust into the new world of privatization surely is subject to

22. See generally, Anthony V. Ralfopol, Russian Roulette: A Theoretical Analysis of Voucher
Privatizationin Russia, II B.U. INT'L. L.J. 435,451 (1993).
23. Again, a detailed discussion of these varied approaches to the privatization of public assets is
beyond the scope of this Article. The essential distinctions between these approaches and the public
offering consist in the much narrower grouping of participants and the fact that it is hard assets rather than
the bundle of interests, rights, and liabilities (or "nexus of contracts") that constitutes the corporation or
"joint stock company" that is being disposed of. See generally Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Law and the
Political Economy of Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa, 21 MD. J.INT'L L. & TRADE 1 (1997).
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skepticism. Finally, stories abound to indicate that there is a need for
checking the exercise of discretion by administering authorities.24
There are three possible avenues for doing so. First, enabling legislation
can (and should) provide for periodic accounting by the administrators. This
might take the form of reports to and oversight hearings by the legislature,
disclosures to the general public, or open meetings and the like.25 Second, the
setup of administrative structure, custom, and practice may encourage
voluntary monitoring of the conduct of the bureaucracy by the general public
at large, or by those with business before the administrative bodies. Finally,
legislation may provide forjudicial or quasi-judicial review. There are tradeoffs of efficiency and accountability among these approaches, and the
preferable one (or combination of approaches) cannot be asserted without
close examination of the sociopolitical and economic environment within
which the privatization is taking place.
Legislative oversight, at best, can only be exemplary. No legislature can
devote its necessarily limited resources to the kind of close scrutiny and close
monitoring that may be essential to assure that a bureaucracy, which is not
already steeped in an ethos of selfless public service, remains fully
accountable to the public interest. Moreover, as with judicial review, close
scrutiny by the legislative branch will raise problems of the appropriate
distribution of power among the various branches of government, the
resolution of which are bound to create significant tensions about (if not
outright challenges to) the legitimacy of fledgling political institutions.
Similarly, dependence on monitoring by interest groups or"civil society" runs
the risk of collusive behavior between the bureaucracy and the private
monitors that may not be in the long-run interest of the larger society.
Take as an example the quite familiar and ubiquitous problem of
"corruption." Broadly understood to refer to the knowing exchange of public
goods by public officials at less than fair value for private benefit, corruption
is a practice whose universal condemnation is rivaled only by its prevalence.
24. Stories of defalcations arising from privatizations in developing and emerging economies such
as Mexico, Russia, and Indonesia, are now staples of reporting in the Western media. Illustrative, for
example, are those related to the role of the Salinas brothers in Mexico's privatizations. See. e.g., Joel
Millman, Mexico Probe Calls a Sell-Off Suspicious, Questions Role of Ex-President's Brother,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1996, at Al 5: cf. Laurie Hays, Friend in the Citi: Private Banker Wooed. Then
Sought to Drop Mexico's Raul Salinas, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1996, at A I (describing relationship between
Citibank and the brother of former Mexico President in moving money out of Mexico into
anonymous/pseudonymous Swiss banking accounts).
25. Nigeria's privatization program, for example, even though undertaken under a military
dictatorship, did require the filing of periodic reports. See Chibundu, supra note 23, at 5-6.

INDIANA JOURNAL GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 7:79

Generally understood to have numerous causes, not the least of which are the
relative economic underpayment of public officials and cultural practices (i.e.,
conditions that are peculiar to the local environment), and the combating of
which were hitherto left to national governments. 6 The scrutiny and
eradication of corruption in recent years has taken on a multilateral
international cast.27 As in other demonstrations of the globalization
phenomenon, the dominant belief is that neither geography nor political and
cultural particularities should be allowed to insulate the practice from the
moral and legal condemnation of the "international community."
Corruption doubtless generates dead-weight loss for those societies in
which it is practiced. By definition, public wealth is transferred to private
actors at less than (or no) value. Thus, it is not only to be condemned, but to
be discouraged, deterred, remedied, and punished. The question that arises is
what is the appropriate forum for doing so. Competing fora must be evaluated
in terms of their likelihood to: first, define the problem rationally within the
context of the actors; second, promote incentives for developing properly
calibrated measures that will tackle the problem; third, facilitate the proper
targeting of those measures for the purpose of procuring their optimal
effectiveness; fourth, provide adequate mechanisms for flexibly adjusting the
measures in response to experience; and fifth, permit the integration or
institutionalization of the measures as regularized components of the social
and economic structures of the society.
Thus, even if it is uniformly accepted that it is (or should be) morally and
legally wrong for a public official to obtain private payment for the
performance of public duty, the occasions in which such may be said to occur
are not transparently uniform. It takes little imagination to condemn a State
minister who awards a public contract because of the transfer to her of ten
percent of the value of the contract, but what do we say of a bureaucrat who
makes such a decision with the knowledge that in a year or two, she will be
looking for employment from the recipient of the contract? True, there is a
temporal difference in their positions; but that difference surely assumes less
significance if we learn that the national institutions of the former have not
26. See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (Supp. 1999).
27. See United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in InternationalCommercial
Transactions, G.A. Res. 191, U.N. GAOR, 51 st Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/191
(1996); Organization of American States: Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996,
35 I.L.M. 724; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. I
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1998).
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evolved sufficiently to permit the revolving door that is a fixed element of the
latter. In such a situation, it is simply nonsensical to speak of corruption
solely in the present.2" Moreover, that contemporaneous quid pro quo is
forbidden, while the use of public positions as springboards for future benefits
is not, does not constitute a satisfactory answer. There may be a variety of
reasons why laws on the books may exist that purport to penalize the former
but not the latter. Their enforcement cannot be meaningfully removed from
the environment in which they operate. Not all laws are, nor should be,
rigorously enforced. There must be an escape hatch for ill-conceived or illimplemented laws, and localizing the enforcement mechanism frequently
presents such an escape mechanism.
In what way, then, does the internationalization of the problem of
corruption further the choice of the local polity as the appropriate forum for
dealing with it? Typically, four arguments are advanced. First, developing
countries and emerging economies are at a severe disadvantage in dealing with
corruption. These economies are very much in need of foreign investments
and have weak bargaining positions in the competition for international
capital. They will therefore be unwilling to take vigorous steps to police
corruption if that would mean short-term loss of investment opportunities to
other developing economies. Creating and enforcing international standards
for corruption would remove this fear because all capital-importing economies
would then present an identical facade on the corruption front, thereby making
it necessary that owners of capital employ criteria that are more legally
defensible for making their choices. Second, since some of the participants
in any corrupt act are necessarily public officials, it might be expecting too
much of any society to rely solely on its own means for policing the conduct.
Third, in any event, the effects of corruption cannot be contained within the
artificial national boundaries that are the creations of politics and geography.
Its effects may be felt as much within the home country of the bribe-giver 29 as
that of the taker. Internationalizing the regulatory framework may thus be
28. Of course, this does not excuse corrupt payments made in explicit violation of law. But it does
undercut the claim that there is or can be some universal standard for determining what constitutes
"corruption," or even the narrower concept-of "bribery."
29. Indeed, this was the basis on which the United States enacted its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-by
far the most comprehensive effort to date to regulate corruption in international commerce. As generally
recounted, the Act was spurred by the perceived effects on U.S. foreign policy of disclosures that U.S.
corporations had bribed foreign leaders in places like the Netherlands, Japan, and Pakistan. See DONALD
R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: A GUIDE FOR U.S. FIRMS DOING
BUSINESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE 3-4 (1994); DON ZARIN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (1995).
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essential both to make the prohibitions effective through active coordination
oftheir enforcement, and to avoid conflicting regulations where each regulator
may otherwise focus on its own narrow needs. Finally, it may be the case that
despite its best intentions, a country simply lacks the resources with which to
fight corruption. When confronted with the necessity to prioritize, law
enforcement, scarce police, judicial, and other technical expertise may be
better devoted to dealing with more visibly devastating ills, or to tackling
issues that are either more readily susceptible to solution or are more likely to
produce immediate and readily perceived results.
As impressive as these explanations might sound at first blush, their closer
scrutiny renders the environment for the globalization of the policing of
corruption less benign. Two preliminary observations are worth making.
First, until the 1990s, the United States stood alone in regulating transnational
corrupt practices, and even so, it limited those regulations to conduct with
very close connection to the United States. Indeed, other industrialized
nations were not only indifferent to the prevalence of corrupt practices in
international commerce, but many of their laws, such as the treatment of the
relevant questionable payments under their tax codes, arguably furthered such
practices.' Second, there is little evidence to indicate either that the incidents
of corruption across the globe have increased in the 1990s, or that the increase
in international attention to the problem during the decade has contributed to
its reduction.32
Ultimately, however, the core difficulty with the globalization of the rules
on corruption is the misshapen focus of the problem that it presents, and the
30. Thus, the law applied to the bribery ofpublic officials ("questionable payments") by U.S. nationals
and to the failure to disclose such payments (where material) by a company whose stock is listed and traded
on an established U.S. securities exchange. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1994).
31. See, e.g., Andreas G. Junius, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Compliance Issuesfrom a German
and European Perspective, 4 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 361, 362, 363 n.5, 369 (1998) (reporting that in
a survey of the tax treatment of payments to public officials in 13 industrialized countries, "five
jurisdictions were found to explicitly deny the deductibility of bribery payments as legitimate business
expenses under their respective tax laws. That leaves the other questioned states allowing the deduction
of international bribe payments by the concerned private business organizations").
32. There is an unfortunate tendency in this age of globalization to equate the popularization in the
West of a topic with its emergence or increased occurrence. Thus, a dynamic argument is presented solely
on the basis of static data, with no effort to show how or why the latter supports the former claim. The
resulting prescriptions thus fail to take account of the potential disruptions they may inflict on the lives of
those to whom the prescriptions will apply. See, e.g., Julie B. Nesbit, Transnational Bribery of Foreign
Officials: A New Threat to the Future ofDemocracy, 31 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 1273 (1998) (contending
on the basis of single-event surveys that "the incidents and magnitude of transnational bribery are on the
rise," and that "recent initiatives against transnational corruption [should] address corruption on a global
scale").
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significant costs that attend this flaw. It is axiomatic that societies differ
significantly in their dividing lines between the public and the private. Yet,
all believe that there is something wrong with the unfettered appropriation of
public goods by private individuals.
Much of the debate about
internationalizing corrupt practices has therefore hinged on the appropriate
rules for reconciling these seemingly divergent realities. One possibility is to
identify a core set of actions that are prohibited at all times and in all places.
Transparency International, a non-governmental organization whose annual
"corruption index" receives much media attention, apparently subscribes to
this perspective since it uses a standardized set of indicators to rank societies
on its corruption index. The approach makes sense if the focus of concern is
to provide information on which a more or less homogeneous cadre of
managers and intelligentsia running multinational corporations, or other
international institutions, can base their conduct, or if the information is
intended simply to titillate or to be didactic to a "globalized community" that
believes itself to have shared norms. If the point of the exercise is less insular,
however, then the approach surely is suspect. For example, the objectives of
data-gathering on corruption might be expected to go beyond the simple
dissemination of condemnatory information to include the varieties of
questionable conduct that arise and the manner different societies deal with
them. Issues of corruption are not only about the moral acceptability of the
underlying conduct or the cost such conduct imposes on "doing business"
within particular societies (aspects that resonate with the Western audience),
but also the effects on the host society of having to adapt to new rules. Those
effects are both short- and long-term. Clearly a society declared to be "very
corrupt" runs the risk of losing foreign investment to those declared to be less
so, and it may be that in the long-term such societies will adapt to the mores
and practices deemed to be acceptable in international commerce. But
pronouncements of standardized criteria, unaided by credible enforcement
mechanisms, do not assure such an outcome.
Seemingly in recognition of this possibility, official approaches to the
regulation of corruption, while condemnatory have left it essentially up to
individual societies both to define and to punish the conduct. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
guidelines, while setting out the range of practices which might be covered by
a bribery statute, nonetheless leave it to the individual State Members to
formulate the specific applicable rules, and to do so within their own legal
structures.
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The approach taken by the United States in its Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, the oldest and without question most developed of this genre of potential
statutes, is illustrative. While making it generally unlawful for U.S. entities
to make corrupt payments to foreign officials, the Act exempts from its
prohibitions payments to those officials whose duties are essentially
"ministerial or clerical,"33 apparently as an acknowledgment of the routine and
lawful practice in some societies of making small or "grease" payments to
procure services from such public officials.34 On its face, this would seem to
demonstrate the capacity of rules formulated within one political system to
take cognizance of and reflect the cultural proclivities of other societies. And
yet, this approach (notwithstanding its benign intent) on closer scrutiny suffers
from significant shortcomings.
In the first place, the obeisance to cultural differences is superficial. The
enacting legislature deems itself competent to decide which of the otherwise
unacceptable practices should be tolerated by the foreign culture. Thus, the
U.S. Congress authorizes U.S. entities to make "facilitating payments" to
foreign officials whose duties are "ministerial," but not to those who exercise
discretion. But by what (or whose) criteria should the existence of discretion
be judged? Are "questionable payments" to a presumptively discretionlacking health inspector at a customs post really any less detrimental to the
well-being of international commerce than like payments to a presumably
discretion-laden supervisor at a State-owned bicycle plant?. When the
questionable payment is picked up by the mass media, the answer is clearly
"yes." Legislatures of course ought to give attention to appearances, but
legislation should not be driven by the need primarily to combat perception.
Of more significance-at least from the perspective of emerging
economies-is the functional consequence of the unilateral arrogation by
individual States of the right and power to decree the parameters of the
conduct oftransnational actors within foreign States. That concern should be
exacerbated by the use of multilateral interest groupings such as the OECD to
sanction the practice. The issue here is not simply the querulous philosophical
totem of sovereignty, as important as that may be in its own right, but the quite
practical one of leveraging regulatory power in one society to the economic
disadvantage of others.

33. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(2) (1976), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2) (1994).
34. The example usually given is that of the acceptability of the "bakshish" in Arab communities. See
Junius, supra note 31, at 361-62.
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Clearly, the regulation of foreign corrupt practices implicates the interests
of the State in which the potentially prohibited conduct takes place as readily
as those of the regulating State. The optimal resolution of any conflict lies in
cooperation among the affected States. Invariably, that will take the form of
attempts at reconciling regulatory approaches. Among the most obvious steps
would be sympathetic efforts at understanding divergent interests, cooperation
among regulators, negotiating relevant standards of conduct, and even
permitting the arbitration of rules by the regulated. It would seem that these
are goals whose realization can be facilitated by the new technologies at the
heart of globalization.
Increasingly, however (and no doubt as an incident and manifestation of
the "globalization" phenomenon), powerful States view such efforts at
reconciliation either as futile or unnecessary. Thus, while international
agreements such as the OECD-sponsored Antibribery Convention provide the
veneer of international collaboration, the substance of the arrangements is to
legitimize unilateral action. Each (wealthy and economically powerful)
OECD Member State is required to adopt laws that penalize the payment of
bribes to foreign officials by economic actors within its jurisdiction. Each
such State thereby determines what constitutes permissible payments made in
foreign countries.
This approach, which is more a testimony to power than to law, is not
limited to governmental action. Employing many of the tools of
globalization-social and technological-organized non-governmental interest
and pressure groups have become prominent actors in the field. These groups,
such as Transparency International, are less susceptible to the accountability
regime that international law seeks to impose on governments. And although
the groups sometimes purport to represent international interests, their
memberships, sources of funds, and articulation of preferences render such
claims highly debatable.
The reality of economic growth in most societies is that it has entailed a
fair amount of "corruption." Individual human beings are not efficiencymaximizing robots. They possess familial passions; they are driven by shortterm calculations of personal advantage; they exercise differential influence
over other persons; and all these tendencies can and are translated into
economic and monetary reward systems. The problem of "corruption" in
many of the so-called "emerging" societies (and certainly in Africa) is often
less about the prevalence of payments for favorable treatment-as much as they
should be addressed-as it is about outright theft of public property by the very
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powerful. Little in the emerging law of corruption addresses or (given the
increasing tendency to deal with these problems through exclusionary clubs,
like the OECD) can address this latter situation. Nor are there any
international conventions seeking to impose regulations on the capacity of
banks or other financial institutions to aid, abet, or launder such lootings."
When strong States act unilaterally, their economic dominance leaves the
weaker States with having to accept the imposed rules with whatever costs
result from their sociopolitical structures, or to seek to countermand them with
offsetting rules, and with the certainty that economic costs would follow. This
is an ironic consequence of globalization. The very tools that permit nearinstantaneous communication, and that enable each individual potentially to
substitute her location and position for that of someone else, render that
individual less likely to take into consideration the consequences of the
policies being advocated. The framing of corruption as an issue of global
concern emanates from the same basic sources and essential impulses as those
already surveyed with regard to privatization: that is, lulled by instantaneous
global communication, superficially similar experiences are all too readily
equated and a handful of successful responses are prescribed as transcendent
solutions. In particular, the role of the private sector is harnessed as the
fountain of wisdom.
In summary, then, the rule of law is relevant to privatization only so long
as it furnishes a means acceptable to those engaged in the process (the local
and the outsider), by which they can make "officialdom" account for its
decisions.
IV. THE RULE OF LAW IN AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The intellectual debate over globalization is in no small measure a contest
about the extent to which there is, or should be, a convergence of practices
and beliefs across geographical boundaries, such that it is optimal to regulate
those practices and beliefs as one. Framed in more familiar terms, the issue
is whether the consequences of globalization have created an international
35. But see JeffGerth, Under Scrutiny: Citibank's Handling of High-Profile Foreigners'Accounts,

N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1999, at A6 (reporting preliminary investigative hearings by U.S. Congressional
committees where the alleged money laundering is deemed antithetical to U.S. political interests). Although
Swiss banks typically are branded as the betes noires institutions for secreting corruptly obtained assets,
it is notable that the Swiss judicial system has perhaps been most forthcoming in investigating the presence
in Switzerland ofdespoiled assets by the political leaders of third world societies. The return of the Marcos
loot to the Philippines being the most widely reported.
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community that can be subjected to standardized rules. Laws function only
within defined communities. A set of conventions has legitimacy as law, only
as long asit is invoked within that community. Outside of the community,
those conventions lose the automatic conferrence (or denial) of legitimation
that is the primary value of legality. Thus, the debate over globalization is
important both for what it says about the existence of a transnational
community bound by legal standards, and the acceptability of those standards.
Power is, of course, relevant to the making of law; yet, once made, law
typically abjures the invocation of power as an integral element of its
legitimation-or perhaps more appropriately, law so enfolds power in itselfthat
they become one. It is the object of law to coerce compliance unobtrusively.
The conditions under which this is possible may be, and have been, debated;
but one instance is where there is a general perception within a community
that the application of law does not depend on the privileged status of a
member of that community.36 Thus, until quite recently-before the onset of
this age of globalization-it was quite common to argue that there was no such
thing as "international law." This was due in part because what passed as
"law" all-too-obviously hinged on the most understood source of
power-military might. For the most part, the international system was said to
be "anarchic" because this power functioned to legitimize authority.
As indicated previously, one of the dominant features of contemporary
globalization is the perception of the creation ofa transnational community in
which geopolitical boundaries are reduced to no more than bureaucratic
nuisances. In this view, power is rendered innocuous, and its use invisible.
Law applies indifferently to persons of all nationalities. The ascendance of
non-governmental entities as the purveyors of power is hailed as a blessing
because it reduces the influence of governments in the making of international
law. The values that these entities espouse and which, presumably, are
thereby embedded in the international legal system that they foster, are those
which promote the interest of the individual over those of the State, human
rights over State rights, democracy over autocracy, and legality over
lawlessness.
But take a second look at these claims: this time from the perspective of
those at the margins. Consider power as flowing less from the possession and
use of military might and more from the ownership and control of economic
assets. Here, we find that one of the remarkable features of the international
legal regime, in this era of globalization, is the role being assigned to two
36. See the discussion of the concept of the "Rule of Law" supra Part Ill.
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principles in the regulation (and indeed creation) of the international economic
order: the hitherto esoteric notion of "national treatment" has become the
norm, and the "most favored nation" status (MFN)-a relic of the bipolar world
of the Cold War-is now accepted as an essential principle of
(non)discrimination. Multinational corporations based in the West push for
the former, and Western "human rights" organizations find the latter
indispensable in the promotion of their objectives. What both principles have
in common, and where they seem to matter, is in bringing to the fore the
power of the government of strong States to subjugate those of weaker ones.
This is so, whether the defense (in the case of national treatment) is "equal
treatment" or (in the case of MFN) is "individual" or "human" rights.
In the abstract, the principle of national treatment accords with what is
perhaps the twentieth century's greatest contribution to civilization, that of the
equality of persons. In its totalizing form, national treatment argues that the
citizenship or nationality of a person or legal entity should be of no account
in the distribution of State-sponsored rights and privileges. Foreign nationals
should receive no less favorable treatment than local citizens. But this
principle has always been applied selectively, primarily through treaty
arrangements. Indeed, in the nineteenth century, powerful States negotiated
for privileged treatment of their nationals. Thus, in Egypt and China (two
end-of-the-century examples), the powerful States of the West imposed upon
these Eastern vassals preferential treatment for Western nationals in access to
the judicial and economic resources of these Eastern States. Similarly, the
"Calvo Doctrine," which required foreign investors to abjure the protection
of their national governments in disputes with their hosts, was a Latin
American response to what these countries perceived as the unprincipled
application of the nationality principle by the dominant European and North
American powers. National treatment, as it emerged in the twentieth century,
was thus an effort to bridge these counter-positions. Moreover, it was not
advocated as a universal principle, but rather as a much hedged and
particularistic concept. Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), perhaps the best known application of the national treatment
principle, exemplifies this particularism.
But the principle is now being unhinged from its particularized moorings.
The proposed draft of the "Multilateral Agreement on Investments" (MAI)
among primarily OECD States (although those whose conduct the Convention
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is intended to regulate will be non-OECD States)" not only provides for
unequivocal and all-encompassing national (and MFN) treatment, 38 but in a
display reminiscent of late nineteenth century power, diplomacy goes on to
also require for additional measure that foreign investors shall receive the
better of such treatment.39
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and various component agreements of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) provide for according treatment to
foreign nationals no less favorable than those granted to nationals of the
signatory State. 4' But, these provisions are more notably nuanced in their
scope and application than those of the MAI. 4'
The evenhanded treatment of all persons who are similarly situated, as
explained earlier, is a positive feature of the rule of law; to the extent that
national treatment is a straightforward application of the feature, it is to be
welcomed. But of course, both domestic and international law frequently
distinguish between nationals and foreigners on the presumption that they are
not "similarly situated." What bilateral and multilateral treaties and
conventions, such as the proliferating Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and
the WTO, do is to overcome the presumption on the basis of "consent" by the
contracting parties. But the presence of "consent" in these situations is at best
a legal fiction. The United States (and other capital exporting States) resorted
to the BIT, precisely as a means of circumventing emerging international
customary law that ratified nationality-based discrimination in the treatment
of foreign investments. 42 Unapologetically using their over-weening economic
muscle, capital exporting States compelled needy, capital-poor States to
choose individually between adherence to the lofty pronouncements of the
37. See Sol Picciato, Lessons of the MAI: Towards a New Regulatory Frameworkfor International
Investment, in LAW, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT (ISS. 1999-1), available at
<http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/global/issue/1999-1/lessonsmai/index.html>.
38. See OECD, MAI Negotiating Text, art. 111 (1), (2) (last modified Apr. 24, 1998)
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/MAl/negtext.htm>.
39. See id. art. 111(3) (National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation Treatment). Noteworthy is the
potential applicability of the national treatment and MFN principles as framed here to non-economic actors
such as religious, cultural, and human rights organizations. See id. art. 11(2) (defining a covered investment
to include "[e]very kind of asset owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by an investor . . . (i) an
enterprise (being a legal person or any other entity constituted or organised under the applicable law of the
Contracting Party, whether or not for profit, and whether private or government owned or controlled....").
40. See, e.g., The Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, art. 10, available at <http://
www.encharter.org/english/fulltext/TreatyO.html> [hereinafter ECT].
41. Cf. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 38, art. Ill, with ECT, supra note 40, art. 10. Exploring
why this is (or may be the case), while interesting is beyond the object of this Article.
42. See. e.g., Kenneth J.Vandevelde, The Political Economy ofa Bilateral Investment Treaty, 92 AM.
J. INT'L L. 621, 628 (1998).
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United Nations General Assembly,4 3 and the practical benefits of friendly
economic relations that would follow the acceptance of a BIT." Similarly,
negotiations in such fora as the Uruguay round of multilateral trading
arrangements (leading to the WTO), the ECT among European States, and the
MAI have insisted on redrafting the terms on national treatment that the
weaker countries, using their numbers and commodity production bottlenecks
of the early 1970s, had sought to enshrine as customary international law.
But the most striking feature of these efforts at creating "international
law" is less the unabashed deployment of power, than it is the open exclusion
of the participation of many of those whose conduct the law directly regulates.
The subtle exclusion of the weak from the lawmaking process-even when
their interests are the most affected-is neither new nor unusual. Exclusion is
sometimes the price to be paid for consensus. Trumpeting such exclusion, and
making it the norm, however, is a radical departure from standard practice,
and challenges the conventional conception of procedural justice which
Western liberal philosophy has generally embraced. The "take it or leave it"
ethos embodied in such approaches as the MAI, where the powerful negotiate
among themselves and then invite others to sign-on and cheerfully singalong,
would seem to pervert the "consent" theory that underlies the use of treaties
as the basic instrument of international law.
And yet, it may be that jettisoning procedural justice as a yardstick of
international legality is an inherent byproduct of globalization. While
industrialization delegitimized the inequalities of feudal distributions,
globalization legitimizes the uneven distributions brought about by differential
access to technology-based information. The justification is not only the
purely economic one of efficiency, but the political-legal one of substantive
justice. Arguably, recent history demonstrates that the threat to human
43. See, e.g., Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. GAOR, 28th
Sess., Supp. No. 30A, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 238 (1974) (leaving it entirely up

to States acting in their sovereign capacity to decide ownership of their natural resources, the appropriate
compensation for disinvesting foreigners of ownership in such resources, and the means for resolving any
disputes that arise from such state actions); Resolution 3201 on a "New International Economic Order,"
G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13
I.L.M. 715 (1974) (asserting that every state enjoys "[flull permanent sovereignty over its natural resources
and economic activities within its borders"); and Resolution 3281, "The Charter ofEconomic Rights and
Duties of States," G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974),
reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975) (declaring that each state has the "right" to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investment within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations and in
conformity with its national objectives).
44. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity ofBilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (1998).
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welfare is less economic predation than it is State-sponsored denials of
The individual and voluntary
individual liberty and human rights.
society") provide the best
"civil
(the
so-called
associations of individuals
guarantee of liberty and human rights. Modern technology provides civil
society with the means to check State power, and globalization enables the
transnational collaboration of civil societies in this venture.
The argument appears flawless. It elicits support from the intelligentsia
of the East as much as of the West, and much of the South as well as the
North. On its face, only governments-the gatekeepers of the State-should be
opposed to this argument. And yet, it is precisely those governments,
particularly of the West, that negotiate the national treatment provisions
discussed above. This paradox suggests that there is something amiss in the
logic of the argument. That the divide of government and civil society (and
in whose service or detriment globalization inures) may not be quite as bright
as depicted above is further illustrated by the disjuncture between the
principle of "most favored nation treatment" and its application in
contemporary international law.
If the national treatment principle can be traced back to the nineteenth
century, the most favored nation doctrine, as a legal standard, is essentially a
post-World War II concept."' Enshrined most prominently in GATT, it
permits flexibility and discrimination in interstate negotiations, while
requiring that the end-product of such negotiations be evenly applied to all
members of the "club." A State gives only as much as it is willing, or able, to
give to the whole, on the basis of its own calculated interests (including, of
course, what it expects in reciprocity from its conduct), not on some uniform
appeal to a standard or mean that represents a "second" or "third" best choice.
Having settled on a standard, however, a State under MFN is then obliged to
apply that standard to all other group members without regard to the level of
reciprocal benefits from each individual State. Thus, MFN simultaneously
recognizes and furthers the interest of each State in determining for itself the
level of engagement with foreign States, while denying that State the capacity
to choose (to discriminate insidiously) among the beneficiaries of that
engagement.
Globalization seems to be undercutting MFN, not enhancing it. In
contrast to national treatment, private groups in the industrialized countries
45. Arguably, however, one may find its seeds in the postwar settlements of the Congress of Vienna
and the various post-revolutionary negotiations between the European powers and the emerging States of
Latin America; but these were too spasmodic to constitute an international legal doctrine.
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increasingly urge their governments to abandon the concept, and to distinguish
and discriminate among States on the basis of such factors as a country's
record on human rights, the environment, child-welfare rules, industrial labor
policies, religious freedom, and market orientation-to name the most
frequently invoked. Consequently, where employment of the national
treatment principle by pressure groups seeks to limit the power of
governments to regulate relationships within their societies, the MFN
principle (or more accurately insistence at denying its application to countries
that run afoul of preferred Western standards)" reinforces the regulatory role
of those governments.
Not surprisingly, there is tension in many Western societies between
groups which, while united in viewing globalization either as the necessitation
orjustification for diminished governmental involvement in society, or as the
universalization of standards and rules, find that their push for these goals
yield paradoxical results. The very technology that creates the perception of
a borderless world of empowered atomic individuals also displays the
rapaciousness of centralized power which can only be regulated by invoking
governmental power. The response has been to look to the international
community to provide the benign governance both to suppress errant national
governments and institutions, and to provide the requisite rules and standards
applicable directly to individuals and subgroups within national societies.
Hence, schemes of simultaneous "harmonization" and "deregulation," and of
"internationalization" and "regional ization" emerge.
But the legitimation (and therefore ultimate legality) of these approaches
is belied by functional realities and normative considerations at the margins.
An internationalized rule of law scheme seems available only through the
coercion of powerful States or powerful pressure groups within those States.
These interests, in order to make effective rules, resort to such fora as the
OECD or sidebars within the WTO. But, these rules are not (and cannot) be
limited solely to the participants; such limitations would denude them both of
effectiveness and of the pretensions of globalization. But the exclusion of
those to whom a law is to apply from the making of that law is precisely the
antithesis of democratic rule, a normative pillar of the emerging international
order. Since that norm cannot be ignored, the next best thing is to rationalize
46. The annual debate in the United States whether to extend or withdraw MFN in the context of
trading relations with the People's Republic of China is, in reality, only the most openly debated of a much
more pervasive phenomenon. Virtually all instances in which "economic sanctions" are sought can be
framed in terms of the withdrawal of MFN.
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the conflict by pretending a concurrence of interests exists among
"democratically elected governments" and "civil society" in the West, and
"civil society" elsewhere-a concurrence whose plausibility modern
technological developments all-too-readily have transformed from the realm
of the imaginary to that of reality. Rarely do proponents of this assumed
concurrence pause to consider the complexities inherent in establishing
convergent interests, not only within more or less similarly endowed societies,
but particularly in polarized ones.
There is, however unfortunate, a concrete reality that cannot be wished
away, even in our globalized mind-set. It is the continuing, and indeed
increasing, gap between those in societies with ready access to the modern
technologies that direct globalization as the relatively unhindered flow of
goods, capital, ideas, and persons (thereby creating the distorting illusion of
a cleavageless community), and those who lack such access. The former's
claim to be a superior voice than traditional governments for the latter must
be treated with a good deal of skepticism, not only because their experiences
differ profoundly, but also because the history of the last decade undercuts it.
Whatever the defects may be (and they are numerous), nondemocratic
governance is more susceptible to being called to account for the rules that
they make and their enforcement than are transnational institutions,
governmental or non-governmental.
Democratic constitutionalism may be the preferred form of assuring
accountability under a rule of law scheme, but so far, it operates solely on a
national basis. This is true even of pretenders to supranational governance,
such as the European Union. Thus, as long as the State is the central unit in
international law responsible for the welfare of a community, the relevant rule
of law norms must be filtered through its perspectives. This is not a claim that
those perspectives are right and just, rather it is a claim that they are essential
to the well-being of the particular community. Globalization's suggestion of
a transparent substitution of the observer for the regulated is an illusion that
is compounded when we assign universal attributes to those institutions that
work for the benefit of the observer. Rapid technological change is bringing
with it significant changes in our capacity to penetrate hitherto distant worlds.
It is less clear that these changes are altering fundamental human nature, and
the latter is just as important in shaping the norms and uses of the rule of law.
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CONCLUSION

The maturation of satellite technology, and the advent of the personal
computer as a near-ubiquitous office and middle-class household product in
the West, have significantly bridged temporal and spatial disjunctions in the
physical transmission and receipt of information.
Whether the effects of these technological changes are more revolutionary.
than those of predecessors such as the telephone, telegraph, or the jet airplane
(not to speak of the steamboat) may be of academic interest. It is clearly the
case that dominated as it is by the professional middle-class, contemporary
weltenschaung presents these transformations as the creation and
manifestation of a new global society. Where hierarchies had dominated the
structure and relations among previous international societies, the new global
society has been portrayed more or less as the freewheeling interplay of
autonomous persons acting for their private gains. Thus, the European
domination of the international society during the colonial age, and the
domination by U.S. multinationals in the age of"interdependence," have given
way to a "global society" where the only hierarchy is that of personal
knowledge, not of nation-States or institutions. It is a global society-not
merely an "interdependent" one-because the individual armed with a
computer and a satellite dish can be just as significant a player in this society
as any nation-State (save perhaps one) or multinational corporation. After all,
that concept is the lesson of the fall of the British Pound Sterling in 1992.
And the ubiquity of U.S. fast-food chains is readily matched and countered by
the internationalization of the appetite for Chinese, Indian, Mexican, and like
"multicultural" foods. Similarly, global Christian evangelism is matched by
the transnationalization of Muslim fundamentalism. World music, of course,
is global, and while the production of commercial cinemas may still be the
preserve of Hollywood and Bombay, they nonetheless draw their themes from
across the globe. Even matters of war and peace evince similar globalizing
phenomena. Not only has the post-Cold War world witnessed an
unprecedented resort to international military coalitions to fight "rogue
States," and the United Nations' system for "peace-making in failing States,"
but these have been done with the active involvement of globalized non-State
actors, notably human rights and charitable groups, that respond to crises
without regard to national frontiers. Thus, the globalization age represents,
as these proponents would have us believe, the ascendance of the
professionalized and technocratic intelligentsia, rather than the dominance of
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Western culture. The guiding ethos, if one is to be found among these actors,
lies in self-actualization rather than in any primordial attachments to kinship,
nationality, or the like. The extent to which these changes either have given
rise to, or reflect, significant restructurings in institutions and cultures is the
critical debate that surrounds the issue of "globalization."
In this Article, I argued that the "two spaces of globalization" are as
present in the area of the "rule of law" as elsewhere. There are those spheres
of technocratic elitism into which a small proportion of the Third World may
have bought, but there are other spaces of globalization-the spaces not simply
of "civil society," but of weakened States. Simultaneous exchange of
The near-instantaneous
information will not cure those conditions.
communication across the globe provided by current and emerging
technologies makes it easy to believe that we are all going through the same
experiences. In this atmosphere, it is tempting to see law, particularly the rule
of law, as simply another commodity easily manufactured according to welldelineated specifications and readily sold across borders and cultures. When
we do so, the specifications we have in mind are, of course, those with which
we are familiar; those that have proved successful in our dominant societies
are those of the West. However, as Kevin Brown's contribution to this
Symposium amply demonstrates, the connection between experience and
values is, to say the least, complicated.4 7 Even if one assumes shared
experiences, the response to those experiences is unlikely to be identical. To
the extent that the rule of law calls for rationally articulable responses to
experience, we may expect the development of certain patterns of behavior;
but it is unlikely that those patterns will be identical in their content.
The one certainty that is likely to transcend the current flux of dynamic
exchanges across the globe, however, is that a period of retrenchment will
follow. The duration of, escape from, and building on that retrenchment will
in significant measure depend on the institutional foundations that are
integrated into the current globalization phenomenon. Implementation of the
rule of law affords one means of creating institutions that will not only aid the
efficient channeling of current outbursts of creative productivity, but that will
also limit the unwelcome but inevitable consequences of current excesses.
However, effective institutionalization of the concept of the rule of law-and
therefore its long-term efficacy-demands stripping out the rhetorical veneer
of self-congratulation or self-aggrandizement that have become the hallmarks
47. See Kevin Brown, Globalization and Cultural Conflict in Developing Countries: The South
African Example, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 225 (1999).
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of its invocation. Focus must be placed on the complex mechanisms of
procedural rectitude, path-dependent substantive reforms, and institutional
checks on power that are essential attributes of the concept. If this Article
persuades the reader that, above all else, the global reach of the rule of law
requires paying a decent respect (i.e., something more than verbal attention)
to local particularities, then it will have succeeded in achieving the writer's
primary objective.

